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1. Introduction
The debate rages on, in South Africa and elsewhere, aboutthe desirability and efficacy of the willing-buyer/willing-seller approach to land redistribution. In South Africa,the willing-buyer/willing-seller approach is frequently
blamed for the fact that the governments redistribution
programme has thus far fallen well short of expectations. To
what extent is this judgement justified? Moreover, if the willing-
buyer/willing-seller approach has indeed contributed to the
unimpressive rate of delivery of the land redistribution
programme, is this on account of certain aspects of the approach
 i.e. which could be selectively remedied  or is the willing-
buyer/willing-seller approach fundamentally unsuited to the
task allocated to it?
 The objective of this paper is to provide a partial answer to
these questions. In short, the paper argues, on the one hand,
that the willing-buyer/willing-seller approach is not as
fundamentally ill-suited a mechanism to effect state-supported
land redistribution as is commonly claimed. On the other hand,
the paper suggests that the unimaginative manner in which the
willing-buyer/willing-seller approach is being applied is
definitely contributing to the slow pace of redistribution, and
reflects a lack of vision and ambition among policy-makers.
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The development of the argument involves examining the
interaction between the land market and the redistribution
programme from different angles. In one angle, we seek simply
to gauge the magnitude of the land redistribution programme
relative to the level of normal activity in the rural property
market (Section 4). A second angle involves an econometric
exercise to determine whether or not the redistribution
programme affects market prices of rural land (Section 5). And
from a third angle, we review the experiences and perceptions
of estate agents and staff of the Department of Land Affairs, so
as to shed light on some of the specific allegations as to how the
land market may be inhibiting redistribution (Section 6). We
begin, however, with two sections by way of background, the
one offering a synopsis of the debate around the willing-buyer/
willing-seller approach (Section 2), and the other reporting
recent trends in the land market (Section 3). We conclude with
an examination of a number of specific policy issues, some of
which suggest promising avenues for policy development and
some of which do not (Section 7).
2. The willing-buyer/willing-seller debate
Variously known also as market-based land reform(Riedinger et al. 2000), market-led agrarian reform(Borras 2000), negotiated land reform (Deininger1997), market-friendly redistribution (Deininger et al.
1999), and most recently  and opaquely  community-based
land reform (World Bank 2001), what we here refer to as the
willing-buyer/willing-seller approach evokes ideological
disputes as well as disagreement as to what is and is not
practicable. These differences are not assisted by the fact that
people have different understandings of what willing-buyer/
willing-seller means, as reflected in the proliferation of labels by
which it is designated. One very strict interpretation, for
example, is that in market-led redistribution, the state works to
correct any market failures that exist (in land, capital, etc.), and
then stands back and allows market mechanisms to drive the
more efficient distribution of land (see El-Ghonemy 1999). On
the other hand, most actual conceptualisations of willing-
buyer/willing-seller programmes anticipate a significant
ongoing role for the state, not least to provide capital to the
willing buyers.
Palmer (2000a) traces the beginning of the willing-buyer/
willing-seller approach to the insistence by Britain that newly
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independent Zimbabwe adopt such an approach for its nascent
land reform programme. Namibia and South Africa followed suit
in due course, despite animated debate in the latter about the
justifiability of the so-called property clause during the drafting
of the interim and then the new constitutions. South Africas
adoption of the property clause is widely understood to have
been a gesture to promote investor confidence. Meanwhile, the
World Bank seized on the idea of willing-buyer/willing-seller,
some claiming that perhaps this was necessitated by its
consistency with the Banks general embrace of market
liberalism (Carter 2001). Since 1995, most World Bank support
to land redistribution programmes equates to support for the
willing-buyer/willing-seller approach.
There are at least three levels to the debate about the willing-
buyer/willing-seller approach. First, the least profound level of
the debate concerns the question whether market mechanisms
are preferable to non-market methods in pursuing the
redistribution of land. As suggested above, this question is
sometimes addressed naïvely. No one in southern Africa, for
example, would think to suggest that the state should not have
a major role to play even within a willing-buyer/willing-seller
framework. However, even assuming an active role for the state,
the question remains whether land to be redistributed should
be expropriated from private owners, or rather purchased from
them through open market sales. In our view, this is a question
of what is pragmatic, at least in the short-term.
A somewhat deeper level of the debate pertains to the
question whether market-based approaches are apt to work to
the disadvantage of the poor, especially in light of various
market imperfections that almost automatically discriminate
against the poor. For example, one claim is that those having
acquired land through some sort of redistribution are likely to
end up forfeiting it, because imperfections in capital markets
are such that they are not able to use the land as profitably as
would otherwise be possible. This, in turn, may result in the
reconsolidation of land holdings to those for whom access to
capital is not so problematic (Carter 1994). This concern relates
to a longer-term perspective, but does not necessarily speak to
the issue of what method should be adopted to pursue land
acquisition.
Finally, at a still more profound level of the debate is the
question whether the introduction of a market-oriented
approach is an arbitrary legitimisation of the status quo pattern
of land ownership  i.e. it presumes the assertion of property
rights to existing property owners, regardless of the dubious
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means by which the land came into their ownership in the first
place (Bromley 2001). This question was at the heart of the
disputes in South Africa over the formulation of the
constitutional property clause.
An epic moment in the willing-buyer/willing-seller debate
occurred at the International Conference on Agrarian Reform
and Rural Development (ICARRD), held in the Philippines in
December 2000. According to one observer (Palmer 2000b), a
lively exchange took place between Klaus Deininger, one of the
most forceful proponents of the World Bank-promoted market-
led approach, and Jeffrey Riedinger of Michigan State
University, who sought to debunk that approach. The paper that
Riedinger presented1 has since become a rallying cry for those
against the willing-buyer/willing-seller approach, which
seemingly included most of the delegates to ICARRD. The paper
makes six main points, corresponding to the main section
headings:
· A market-based approach to agrarian reform will
redistribute little land and benefit few landless families.
· A market-based approach to land reform is likely to be
unaffordable to the would-be beneficiaries because the
market value of land exceeds the agronomic value of the
land.
· If implemented, large-scale market-based agrarian reform
will drive up land prices, effectively excluding poor farmers
from the benefits of reform.
· Would-be beneficiaries of market-based agrarian reform
lack access to affordable private credit markets to finance
their share of the land cost.
· The empirical record of market-based reforms offers little
evidence that this approach will result in rapid or significant
redistribution of land.
· Uncertainty in the agricultural sector can best be addressed
by a clear commitment to rapid completion of conventional 
compulsory acquisition-based  agrarian reform. (Riedinger
et al. 2000.)
Not surprisingly, a number of these same points are echoed in
criticisms made of South Africas approach to land
redistribution. For example, Lahiff and Scoones (2001) state
that: Both restitution and redistribution have suffered from
over-reliance on market mechanisms to acquire land and
cumbersome and ineffective bureaucratic processes. Similarly,
the National Land Committee (2000) has written that:
A key limitation underlying redistribution is the
[Constitutional] protection of property rights of current
School of Government, University of the Western Cape 5
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landowners, and the guarantee of compensation for land
transferred. The effect of a willing-buyer, willing-seller
framework and the requirement of fair and just
compensation for existing land owners, is the placing of
financial constraints on the extent of land transfer.
Successive limited national budgets for land reform made
the RDPs 30% target for redistribution unattainable by 1999.
Even the government itself has publicly questioned the willing-
buyer/willing-seller approach. For example, the Ministry of
Agriculture and Land Affairs preliminary review of the
redistribution programme in December 1999 claimed that
marginal land [is] being bought at exorbitant prices, turning
white landowners into instant millionaires.2 A year later, the
Minister and the Director General of the Department of Land
Affairs again attributed the delay in land reform to high prices
demanded by landowners, once more raising the threat of
expropriation while simultaneously defending market-based
solutions (Lahiff 2001).3
Interestingly, of the major changes to the governments
approach to redistribution unveiled in the new Land
Redistribution for Agricultural Development (LRAD) initiative,
none is directed at the manner in which the land market is
relied upon. Notwithstanding the governments vocal criticisms
of landowners ability to hinder redistribution, and thus
implicitly of the willing-buyer/willing-seller approach, that
approach remains entirely intact.
3. Recent trends in the land market
This section reports recent trends in the rural landmarket. The trends are interesting in themselves, butalso form an important backdrop for the question ofwhat effect the land redistribution programme may be
having on the land market.4
Table 1 shows the average price per hectare for the whole of
South Africa from 1995 to 2000, stated in constant 2000 Rand.
The table shows a marked downward trend in average per
hectare prices from 1995 to 1998  by about 28% for the whole
period  and thereafter a partial recovery. Average land prices in
2000 were about 14% lower than in 1995.
Table 2 shows annual average prices per hectare
disaggregated into various size categories for the whole of
South Africa from 1995 to 2000, also stated in constant 2000
Rand. The table shows a significant inverse relationship
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Table 1: National average prices per hectare, 1995 to 2000
Year of purchase Average price per Annual percentage Percentage change
hectare change relative to 1995
1995 1 204
1996 1 048 13.0% 13.0%
1997 992 5.3% 17.6%
1998 866 12.7% 28.1%
1999 936 8.1% 22.3%
2000 1 031 10.1% 14.4%
Table 2: National average prices per hectare per size category, 1995 to 2000
Size 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 % change
category 19952000
(hectares)
15 111 784 110 327 112 646 104 663 90 991 113 171 1.2%
620 27 135 27 604 27 371 23 501 23 643 25 371 6.5%
21100 8 578 8 658 8 663 7 488 7 442 8 127 5.3%
101500 1 942 1 926 1 873 1 726 1 730 1 755 9.6%
5011 000 963 962 978 859 903 989 2.7%
1 0015 000 450 489 451 451 506 489 8.8%
5 001+ 131 160 205 267 148 194 48.0%
between average per hectare prices and property size. That is,
the smaller the property the higher the average price per
hectare and vice versa. There are several reasons for this
relationship, including the fact that very small properties tend
to be for residential purposes (and the average price per hectare
subsumes the value of houses and other improvements on the
property), as well as the fact that among true farm properties,
larger farms tend to be of lower quality land, for example
extensive grazing land rather than arable land. The table also
shows that the downward trend in average per hectare prices
reported in the first table holds as well for most of the size
categories, and is especially strong for the smaller size
categories. This may reflect the fact that the market for plots 
i.e. small agricultural holdings on the periphery or cities and
large towns  has become especially weak in the last few years.
School of Government, University of the Western Cape 7
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Table 3: National average prices per hectare per size category, 1995 to 2000
Size category (hectares) Share of total no. of Share of total area Share of total value of
transactions transacted transactions
15 17.3% 0.1% 9.9%
620 16.0% 0.4% 9.4%
21100 20.2% 2.0% 16.0%
101500 24.5% 13.8% 25.2%
5011 000 10.5% 15.5% 14.5%
1 0015 000 10.0% 43.0% 20.2%
5 001+ 1.4% 25.3% 4.8%
All 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Table 4: Average per hectare prices by province, 1995 to 2000
Province 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 % change
19952000
Eastern Cape 735 690 707 483 539 584 25.8%
Free State 832 863 719 641 751 800 4.1%
Gauteng 12 245 12 645 8 574 7 300 8 127 4 735 158.6%
KwaZulu- 2 856 2 761 2 497 2 610 2 509 2 457 16.3%
Natal
Limpopo 1 123 1 048 946 865 946 1 163 3.5%
Mpumalanga 1 055 1 163 1 195 1 074 1 278 1 563 32.5%
North West 1 689 1 401 1 538 1 568 1 673 1 749 3.4%
Northern 222 198 189 167 207 215 2.9%
Cape
Western 1 826 1 431 1 726 1 089 1 442 1 735 5.2%
Cape
One might be curious to know why the overall price trend
between 1995 and 2000 is downwards, even though some of the
larger size categories experienced upward movements. The
reason is that, although parcels larger than 500 hectares
account for almost 84% of the transacted area, their share of the
total value is less than 40%. It should also be noted that the
huge increase in the average price per hectare for properties
that exceed 5 000 hectares reflects a very small number of
transactions, thus one might reasonably expect an even greater
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degree of price volatility than characterises the land market
generally. Table 3 provides detail on the share of transactions by
number, area and value, for each of the same size categories
indicated above.
Finally, Table 4 shows the real average prices per hectare
from 1995 to 2000 at the aggregate provincial level. There are
strong downward trends for the Eastern Cape and Western
Cape, a spectacularly strong decline for Gauteng, and a strong
increase in Mpumalanga. The table also reveals that the price
volatility in the land market has a geographical dimension.
Clearly, there is much more volatility in land prices than is
suggested by national averages.
4. The prevalence of redistribution projects in the
land market
By most measures, the land redistribution programmeaccounts for a small share of the activity in the ruralland market. This is not surprising, given that the totalamount of land redistributed to date through the
redistribution programme is around 1% of the total commercial
farmland area of the country.
Table 5 shows the amount of land redistributed under the
land redistribution programme as a share of the total land
transactions registered in the Deeds Office database from 1995
to 2000, as well as a share of the total commercial agricultural
land. For example, the land redistributed in 1999 to land reform
beneficiaries was only 3% of the total land transactions reported
by the Deeds Office for that year, and was only 0.2% of total
commercial farmland. The results also show that out of
approximately 33 million hectares of land transacted from 1995
to 2000 as reported by the Deed Office, only 2.3% was by way of
land redistributed under the land redistribution programme,
which constituted only 0.8% of the total commercial farmland.
Table 6 shows the amount of land redistributed by DLA as a
share of rural land transactions, on a province-by-province
basis. The data are aggregated over the period 1995 to 1999.
The table reveals significant provincial variation in the extent to
which the redistribution programme figures in the rural land
market, with a high of 12% for KwaZulu-Natal, and a low of 0.4%
for the Western Cape. Among other things, this means that one
might expect to find that redistribution is having an impact on
the land market (e.g. exerting an upward pressure on land
School of Government, University of the Western Cape 9
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Table 5: Shares of the land redistributed relative to total land transactions and
total commercial farmland, 1995 to 2000
Year Land redistributed Total rural land Land redistributed Land redistributed as
by DLA (ha) transactions (ha) as % of total rural % of total commercial
land transactions farmland
1995 11 171 4 721 085 0.2% 0.01%
1996 67 887 4 617 915 1.5% 0.08%
1997 140 524 5 719 425 2.5% 0.16%
1998 273 416 6 494 852 4.2% 0.32%
1999 174 287 5 704 042 3.1% 0.20%
2000 89 409 5 500 000 * 1.6% * 0.10%
Total 756 694 32 757 319 2.3% 0.88%
* Estimates
 Sources: DLA (19952000); Deeds Office data (19952000); and Abstract of Agricultural Statistics (1999).
Table 6: Percentage shares of the land distributed to the total land transactions
per province, aggregated over 1995 to 1999
Province Land redistributed by Rural land transactions Share
DLA (ha) (ha)
Eastern Cape 45 507 2 649 807 1.7%
Free State 65 117 3 869 432 1.7%
Gauteng 4 913 404 231 1.2%
KwaZulu-Natal 162 549 1 324 063 12.3%
Limpopo 26 484 3 029 095 0.9%
Mpumalanga 29 556 2 093 044 1.4%
North West 13 695 2 558 270 0.5%
Northern Cape 371 120 7 922 420 4.7%
Western Cape 15 110 3 406 957 0.4%
Sources: DLA (19951999); Deeds Office data (19951999).
prices) in KwaZulu-Natal, but certainly not in the Western Cape
or North West. It is noteworthy that KwaZulu-Natal registered
one of the larger declines in land prices over this period.
The purpose of Table 7 is to convey a sense of how active the
rural land market is in different parts of the country. On
average, over this 5-year period, 6.3% of all rural land was
transacted per year. While there is a fair amount of provincial
variation, the least active province, which is Eastern Cape at 5%,
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Table 7: Shares per province of total land transactions to total commercial
farmland, 1995 to 1999
Province Average annual land Total commercial Share
transactions (ha) farmland (ha)
Eastern Cape 529 961 10 815 867 4.9%
Free State 773 886 11 572 000 6.7%
Gauteng 80 846 828 623 9.8%
KwaZulu-Natal 264 813 3 439 403 7.7%
Limpopo 605 819 7 153 772 8.5%
Mpumalanga 418 609 4 486 320 9.3%
North West 511 654 6 785 600 7.5%
Northern Cape 1 584 484 29 543 832 5.4%
Western Cape 681 391 11 560 609 5.9%
RSA 5 451 463 86 186 026 6.3%
Sources: Deeds Office data (19951999); Abstract of Agricultural Statistics (1999).
is still quite ample. It is important to note that these figures do
not include land changing ownership via inheritance or
expropriation.
The overall conclusion to be drawn from these tables is that,
as of 1999, redistribution accounted for an extremely modest
share of the vibrant activity that characterises the rural land
market. The implication is that, strictly in terms of volumes, the
land market cannot be said to be have inhibited the
redistribution programme. Of course, geographical variation, as
well as other aspects of the land market, must be examined.
In terms of geographical variation, one interesting point to be
noted is that the spread of redistribution projects is highly
uneven. As of the end of 1999, there had been 408
redistribution projects across the country, meaning an average
of 1.4 projects for each of the 288 districts with an active land
market (i.e. outside of the former homeland areas). However,
these were not spread evenly through the country. Table 8
reports how many magisterial districts have hosted various
numbers of redistribution projects. The table reveals that, of the
magisterial districts with an active land market, almost 52%
have not had a single redistribution project between 1994 and
1999. Another 23% have had only one redistribution project.
Meanwhile, a small handful of districts, about 10%, have had
four or more projects. Altogether, about 46% of the projects have
School of Government, University of the Western Cape 11
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Table 8: Prevalence of redistribution projects among magisterial districts, 1994 to 1999







5 + 19 6.6%
Total 288 100.0%
taken place in less than 7% of the 288 districts with an active
land market.5
This implies two things. First, there are large swaths of the
country where, as of the end of 1999, redistribution had not
happened at all, or only to a very small extent; and second,
whatever effects redistribution projects may have had on the
land market are likely to have been quite local.
One constraint of the foregoing analysis is that it ends at the
conclusion of 1999. What has happened in 2001 and to some
extent 2000 is difficult to judge due to lack of data. However,
given that the Department of Land Affairs redistribution
expenditure declined from R358 million in 1998/99, to R173
million and R154 million in 1999/2000 and 2000/01,
respectively, it is safe to assume that the overall scale of
redistribution in 2001 was lower than in 1999 and 2000.
5. The effect of the land redistribution programme
on the land market6
Strict economic reasoning would suggest that the landredistribution programme would have the effect ofincreasing land prices over what they would have beenin the absence of the programme. Riedinger et al.
(2000) assert that this effect would be such as to make the
programme unaffordable. Similarly, in a 1999 report on the
property tax tabled before the Parliaments finance portfolio
committee, the Department of Land Affairs suggested that the
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upward pressure exerted by redistribution on land prices might
constitute a rationale for a price-depressing land/property tax:
It stands to reason that as delivery continues to pick up, land
redistribution could so increase the aggregate demand for
land as to exert a noticeable upward pressure on land
prices. If the price-flexibility of land is around -0.2  , then
a 12% net addition to the aggregate demand for land (e.g. if
the DLA doubles its budget and delivers at capacity) could
force an increase in prices of around 2%. Therefore, a
countervailing downward pressure on land prices might be
desirable, not just for land reform, but for others seeking to
get into agriculture.7
On the other hand, landowners are sensitive to changing
patterns of land ownership and settlement in their immediate
surroundings. This sensitivity among mainly white farmers can
have tangible effects. For example, in the eastern part of
Bloemfontein magisterial district, a number of redistribution
projects took place in 1996/97. Initially, these sales took
advantage of the fact that land prices close to Botshabello and
Thaba Nchu tended to be relatively modest. However, the
concern of other white landowners in the area was such that
these initial projects seemingly set off a chain reaction of white
farmers wishing to sell, spreading west from Thaba Nchu back
towards Bloemfontein.8 Estate agents and remaining farmers in
the area report that none of the whites fears were realised, but
the effect on the land market was nonetheless very real.
This is not to suggest that landowners fears are necessarily
racist of strictly irrational. Stock theft and fence cutting can
seriously affect farming profitability, and occur in some
commercial farming areas on such a scale as to compel a change
in the pattern of production there. (In certain areas of the
country, farmers have switched from sheep to cattle, because
sheep have proven to be more easily stolen; similarly, some
farmers have switched from maize and beans to soya, because
soya is less likely to be stolen.) However, there is also a racial
element, which Land Affairs officials come into contact with on a
daily basis. Many landowners presume that if an adjacent
property is acquired by black people, then these problems will
necessarily increase, especially if the new black neighbours do
not conform to the model of a single nuclear farming family.
There is no a priori rationale for gauging which of these two
countervailing forces should be greater, i.e. the positive pressure
due to the exogenous increase in land demand, or the negative
pressure associated with white property owners wishes to not
have black neighbours. Perhaps the most reasonable
School of Government, University of the Western Cape 13
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Table 9: Six econometric models
Model Dependent variable Explanatory var. 1 Explanatory var. 2 Explanatory var. 3
I Log(PRICE) T_NUMBER RP_NUMBER
II Log(PRICE) T_NUMBER RP_NUMBER RP_NUMBER_LAG
III Log(PRICE) T_NUMBER HH COMM
IV Log(PRICE) T_AREA RP_AREA
V Log(PRICE) T_AREA RP_AREA RP_AREA_LAG
VI Log(PRICE) T_AREA HH COMM
expectation, in fact, is that thus far the land redistribution
programme has been simply too modest in scale to have had any
effect on land prices. This paper bears out that indeed the scale
of the redistribution programme has been very small relative to
normal land market activity, even given the recent poor
performance of the land market. What the paper also reveals is
that land redistribution is not spread evenly throughout the
country, but rather tends to occur with greater frequency in
some districts. What we can say is that, if redistribution does
have any sort of effect on land prices, then this will most likely
be observable locally.
This section presents the results of an econometric analysis of
the effect of land redistribution on land prices between 1995
and 1999. The analysis attempts to link changes in average land
prices at the magisterial district level, to the intensity of land
redistribution activity in that district.
5.1 Approach
The econometric model explored here relates the average per
hectare price of land in a given magisterial district in a given
year to the amount of activity in the land market, and the
amount of land redistribution activity also taking place in that
district in that year. The variables are formulated and combined
in a number of different ways in order to better understand the
relationships between them.
The data set used covers both districts and time, in other
words, it has both cross-sectional and time series dimensions.
This provides what is known as panel data or pooled data.
Accordingly, special econometric techniques for panel data can
be applied. The relationship between the dependent variable
(i.e. average per hectare price) and the explanatory variables (i.e.
land market activity, redistribution activity, etc.) is tested in
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six main ways, relating to different ways of measuring and
combining the explanatory variables.9 This is represented in
Table 9.
Log(PRICE) represents the natural logarithm of the average
per hectare price for a particular magisterial district in a
particular year; T_NUMBER is the number of different rural land
transactions in that district in that year; T_AREA represents the
total number of hectares of rural land (in tens of thousands)
transacted in that district in that year; RP_NUMBER is the
number of redistribution projects approved for transfer in that
district in that year; RP_NUMBER_LAG is the number of
redistribution projects approved for transfer in that district in
the previous year; RP_AREA is the total number of hectares of
rural land (in tens of thousands) approved for transfer via the
redistribution programme in that district in that year;
RP_AREA_LAG is the total number of hectares of rural land (in
tens of thousands) approved for transfer via the redistribution
programme in that district in the previous year; HH is the total
number of households included within projects approved for
transfer via the redistribution programme in that district in that
year; and COMM is the number of municipal commonage
projects approved for transfer via the redistribution programme
in that district in that year.10
The natural logarithm is used on the dependent variable to
facilitate interpretation of the results. The purpose of using the
lag values of RP_NUMBER and RP_AREA is to test the
proposition that some of the effects of redistribution projects on
the land price may not be contemporaneous, but rather occur
after a lapse of time.
It should be noted that the models described above are ad
hoc, in the sense that they are not based on a structural model
about what determines land prices (e.g. supply and demand, or
relative changes in profitability, etc.). The purpose of the
exercise is not to explain the variation of land prices, but rather
to discern the relationship of land prices to other key variables,
most notably having to do with redistribution. No doubt more
sophisticated models could be devised, though whether they
would shed additional illumination on the role of redistribution
is another question.
Each of these six main models is tested with two different
sub-sets of the data. First, each model is tested on the basis of
all of the rural property transactions data. Second, the models
are tested on the basis of a restricted data set, whereby only
transactions of 100 hectares or larger and 5 000 hectares or
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smaller are counted when determining the average price per
hectare, as well as the T_NUMBER and T_AREA variables. The
rationale for using this more limited data set is that the market
for extremely small and extremely large properties may not be
sensitive in the same way to the amount of redistribution
activity occurring in that district. This restricted data set is
smaller by 85 observations, or about 6%.
In addition, each of these six main models is tested with
different estimators. The most important of these are the fixed
effects11 estimator and the random effects12 estimator. In fixed
effects (also known as the least square dummy variable, or
LSDV, estimator), differences between cross-sectional units (in
our case magisterial districts) are ascribed to fixed constants, i.e.
dummy intercepts, which are assumed to be invariant over time,
and which can themselves be estimated. In random effects, by
contrast, the differences between cross-sectional units are
assumed to be subsumed into the error term. For our purposes,
since we lack a strong a priori preference for either estimator
over the other, we test and report both.13 Besides the fixed
effects and random effects estimators, we also report the results
of the between estimator,14 which is a by-product of estimating
the random effects model since the random effects coefficient
vector is calculated as a matrix weighted average of the LSDV
and between estimators. The between estimator is seldom
reported in its own right in cases where the analyst is fortunate
enough to have access to panel data, since it amounts simply to
a regression of the dependent variable upon the explanatory
variables, where all of the variables are captured as means per
unit over time, thus in essence abstracting from the temporal
aspect of the multivariate relationship. However, the results of
the between regression can nonetheless be interesting,
especially given that the time lag of effects is not always well-
understood and is not necessarily the same in all districts.
Altogether, therefore, we run and report 36 regressions, six
for each of the six models described above. Certain adjustments
to the estimators have to be made on account of the fact that
the present panel is unbalanced. The panel is unbalanced in
the sense that there is not a full complement of five data
observations (for the number of years) for each and every
district, thus some districts have fewer data observations than
others. The usual scenario is that, in a given district in a
particular year, there were no rural property transactions
registered with the deeds registry, thus no average price per
hectare can be calculated. (This is very different to saying that
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land had no price  just that in the absence of transactions, the
price is not observable.) This requires numerous adjustments to
be made to the estimator. The necessary adjustments are made
following Greene (2000:566567, 577578). The code was
written and run using GAUSS 3.0.
5.2 Data
There are two types of data used in the present analysis. First,
there are data specific to the land redistribution programme,
namely, the number of redistribution projects, the amount of
land involved in each project, number of households and
commonage projects, location, year in which project was
finalised, etc. These data came from the DLAs CPD (Critical
Project Database) system, and in some cases were
supplemented with data collected directly from the files kept on
the premises of the DLA offices in Pretoria. On the whole, only
regular redistribution projects and commonage redistribution
projects were included. Redistribution projects involving share-
equity schemes were excluded because they often do not involve
land purchase, and thus would not be expected to affect the
market price of land, or at least not in the same way.
The second type of data pertains to activity in the land market
more generally. These data were purchased from the Deeds
Office, and were cleaned and manipulated as described in the
technical notes accompanying the Land Price Data Base. The
data purchased cover all rural property transactions that were
registered between 1994 and 1999. Prices are all translated into
1999 Rand using the CPI deflator.
The main caveat to be noted in regard to these data is that
our knowledge is imperfect in terms of knowing the magisterial
district within which transactions took place. The Deeds Offices
around the country do not typically record the magisterial
district when a property transaction is registered. Rather, they
indicate the registration division or the administrative district,
which may or may not have any correspondence to magisterial
district boundaries. In order to identify the districts in which
land transactions have taken place, the Deeds Office data were
linked to the cadastre. The process of linking to the cadastre
was largely successful, but resulted in the loss of about 8% of all
the records for the country overall. The loss of these records is
the result of either errors in the Deeds Office data, or errors in
the cadastral data, or both. For the purposes of this exercise,
this means that the dependant variable, Log(PRICE), is based on
an incomplete list of transactions from that district, while the
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T_NUMBER and T_AREA variables are somewhat lower than they
should be for the same reason.
A second caveat relates to the fact that when the purchase of
a property is registered with the Deeds Office, two dates are
reported in conjunction with that transaction, namely the date
of purchase and the date of registration. The date of registration
is obviously the point in time when the transaction was
registered with the Deeds Office, while the date of purchase is
the point in time prior to this when the seller and buyer
concluded their negotiations. Not infrequently these dates are
far apart, and sometimes to such an extent that they occur in
different years, though seldom more than one year apart. For
the purposes of this exercise, purchase year is considered
more relevant than registration year, because the year in
which the seller and buyer agreed on a price is the year in
which we should look for effects on land prices. However, this
presents a problem, in that not all transactions for which the
purchase year was 1999 will be represented in our data set,
since not all such transactions will have been registered in
1999, and until a property is registered, it does not appear in the
data set. There is no attempt to correct for this problem directly.
5.3 Results
The results are presented below in Table 10. The results for the
six different models appear sequentially, while for each model
the results for the different types of estimators, and on the basis
of the unrestricted and restricted data sets, are arranged across.
Estimates of constants are not shown, including those of the
288 intercept dummies for the fixed effects model. T-ratios
based on the zero-slope null hypothesis are reported beneath
the estimated slope coefficients. N indicates the number of
observations available for the regression, while R2, or coefficient
of determination, gives an indication as to overall goodness of
fit of the fitted regression, meaning the extent to which the
model explains the variation of the dependent variable.
We look here mainly at the results for the six regressions run
according to Model I. Starting with the results of the first
regression (column [1]), i.e. for the fixed effects estimator for
unrestricted data (All ha), the estimated slope coefficients can
be interpreted as follows. First, everything else held constant,
an increase of 1 in the number of rural property transactions
(T_NUMBER) is associated with a 0.1% increase in the average
land price, for all districts and years. Similarly, and more
interestingly, an increase of 1 in the number of redistribution
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Table 10: Full regression results for the six models
Model/Variable ß FE   (fixed effects) ß RE    (random effects)  ß BET (between estimator)
[1] All ha [2] 1005 000 ha [3] All ha [4] 1005 000 ha [5] All ha [6] 1005 000 ha
Model I
T_NUMBER 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.003 0.002
*(1.74) (0.19) ****(2.97) (0.53) ****(3.99) (1.10)
RP_NUMBER 0.013 0.006 0.014 0.007 0.185 0.057
*(1.93) (1.06) **(2.04) (1.28) ****(3.09) (1.52)
N 1 353 1 268 1 353 1 268 288 276
R2 0.918 0.857 0.102 0.189 0.065 0.017
Model II
T_NUMBER 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.003 0.001
(1.60) (0.08) ****(2.85) (0.64) ****(4.14) (1.04)
RP_NUMBER 0.013 0.006 0.014 0.007 0.581 0.259
*(1.93) (1.04) **(2.03) (1.23) ***(2.39) *(1.70)
RP_NUMBER_LAG 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.443  0.227
(0.73) (0.84) (0.75) (1.09) *(1.68) (1.37)
N 1 353 1 268 1 353 1 268 288 276
R2 0.918 0.857 0.103 0.190 0.074 0.024
Model III
T_NUMBER 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.003 0.002
**(2.02) (0.16) ****(3.22) (0.60) ****(3.48) (1.33)
HH 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000
(0.75) (0.42) (0.80) (0.40) (1.52) (0.08)
COMM 0.007 0.011 0.014 0.019 0.712 0.437
(0.31) (0.60) (0.65) (1.05) ****(3.39) ****(3.32)
N 1 353 1 268 1 353 1 268 288 276
R2 0.917 0.857 0.101 0.192 0.078 0.047
Model IV
T_AREA 0.028 0.033 0.041 0.047 0.099 0.086
****(4.94) ****(4.13) ****(7.66) (6.68) ****(7.26) ****(6.00)
RP_AREA 0.007 0.007 0.006 0.013 0.033 0.185
(0.34) (0.40) (0.31) (0.78) (0.24) **(2.25)
N 1 353 1 268 1 353 1 268 288 276
R2 0.919 0.859 0.136 0.228 0.181 0.147
Model V
T_AREA 0.028 0.033 0.041 0.047 0.103 0.085
****(4.94) ****(4.15) ****(7.65) ****(6.71) ****(7.28) ****(5.94)
RP_AREA 0.006 0.003 0.005 0.008 0.386 0.417
(0.28) (0.19) (0.25) (0.46) (0.92) *(1.70)
RP_AREA_LAG 0.003 0.009 0.002 0.012 0.537 0.308
(0.14) (0.55) (0.12) (0.76) (1.06) (1.01)
N 1 353 1 268 1 353 1 268 288 276
R2 0.919 0.859 0.137 0.228 0.184 0.150
Model VI
T_AREA 0.028 0.033 0.041 0.047 0.097 0.088
****(4.93) ****(4.13) ****(7.66) ****(6.70) ****(7.24) ****(6.05)
HH 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.78) (0.22) (0.75)  (0.10) (0.69)  (0.76)
COMM 0.008 0.003 0.008 0.007 0.277 0.324
(0.35) (0.14) (0.35)  (0.40) (1.34)  ****(2.58)
N 1 353 1 268 1 353 1 268 288 276
R2 0.919 0.859 0.137 0.228 0.188 0.154
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Notes to Table 10
t-values are given in parenthesis
* significant at the 10% significance level
** significant at the 5% significance level
*** significant at the 2% significance level
**** significant at the 1% significance level
ß FE estimated slope coefficients using the fixed effects of least squares dummy
variable (LSDV) estimator
ß RE estimated slope coefficients using the random effects estimator via feasible
generalized least squares
 ß BET estimated slope coefficients using the between groups estimator
projects in a district is associated with a 1.3% decline in the
average land price.15 The magnitude of this effect is huge, but
the t-ratio of 1.93 on the RD_NUMBER variable is significant at
only the 10% significance level, meaning that there is a 10%
probability that the conclusion of a non-zero effect of
redistribution is erroneous.
Moving across to the results of the next regression (column
[2]), that for the fixed effects model but on the basis of the
restricted data set, the results are not significant at any
respectable level. However, the results of the third regression
(column [3]), that of the random effects model based on the
unrestricted data, agree very closely with those for the first
regression. Here, an additional land redistribution project is
associated with a 1.4% decline in average land prices. The t-ratio
is such that the result is significant at the 5% significance level,
thus lending some corroboration to the first regression. The
results of the fourth regression (column [4]) are similar to those
for the second regression. At least up to this point, the use of
the restricted data set does not evince any significant statistical
relationship.
Turning finally to the regression results for the between
estimator, there is evidence of a very strong and negative
relationship between the number of redistribution projects and
prevailing land prices. Because of the nature of the between
estimator, the interpretation of the estimated slope coefficients
is, however, different to that of the other estimators. Here, one
would observe that an increase in one in the average annual
number of redistribution projects in a district is associated with
a 18.5% decline in average land prices. The implication could be
that sustained land redistribution activity in an area has a
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disproportionately large impact on local land prices. For the
sixth regression (column [6]), the results are not significant.
The results up to now provide some evidence that when land
redistribution projects are introduced in a particular area,
prevailing land prices decline. However, this conclusion is
tentative, not least because all of those regressions conducted
thus far on the basis of the restricted data set do not provide
robust support for it. Moreover, we have yet to examine the
results of all of the regressions associated with the other five
models.
Before proceeding to discuss the other results, however, it is
worth considering alternative explanations for the negative
statistical relationship between land price and the extent of
redistribution that has been found in some of the regressions.
In particular, this statistical relationship does not in itself
demonstrate a causal relationship, nor what the nature of such
a causal relationship might be. It could be, for example, that
rather than more redistribution leading to lower land prices,
what in fact happens is that redistribution happens where land
prices are lower. This second interpretation is not altogether
without merit, in that places where land prices are especially
high are known to be difficult areas to reach through
redistribution. However, the geographical unit employed in this
particular analysis is the magisterial district. Outside of
Gauteng and the Cape Peninsula, magisterial districts tend to
be large and heterogeneous areas, which may well contain some
inaccessibly expensive farmland, but probably also more
affordable farmland as well. Thus, this counter-explanation is
not very compelling.
Most of the spatial determination of redistribution projects
appears to be based on where the demand is expressed, and
usually there is ample variation within a district to accommodate
that demand. Unfortunately, the statistics themselves do not
guide us towards the correct interpretation. Techniques for
explicitly testing the time-dimension of causal effects would not
necessarily assist, given the coarse annual nature of the data,
though they could in principle be explored. As is usually the
case, the evidence of a statistical relationship must be linked to
an economic (i.e. causal) interpretation of that relationship, via a
plausible leap.
The results for the other five models can be summarised as
follows:
· In general, the results show either a negative relationship
between average prices and the extent of redistribution, or
no discernible relationship. There is no evidence of a positive
relationship. The single exception is the estimated slope
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coefficient on the RP_NUMBER_LAG variable (Model II) when
using the between estimator, which is nonetheless smaller
in magnitude and significance than the negative
relationship estimated on RP_NUMBER in the same
equation.
· The estimated slope coefficients of the fixed effects and
random effects models tend to be very similar to one
another.
· Where lags are included among the explanatory variables,
there is little evidence that they have a strong, distinctive
influence on land prices. This could suggest that the effects
of redistribution on land prices, where they occur at all, are
realised very quickly, which is not to say that they are
dispelled quickly.
· The variable representing the number of households (HH)
nowhere elicits a significant relationship to average land
prices. However, for the between regression, the variable
representing the number of commonage projects shows a
strong negative relationship to land prices.
· Results tend to be insignificant where variables are
measured in terms of area (hectares) rather than number, as
in models IVVI. The reasons for this are not at all obvious.
Taken as a group, we would summarise by saying that there is
tentative evidence that land redistribution has the effect of
lowering land prices locally, but the evidence is not
overwhelming. There is, however, strong evidence against the
supposition that redistribution exerts a positive upward
pressure on land prices. If anything, the situation is the
contrary.
5.4 Summary
This section has reported the results of an econometric
examination of the relationship between average land prices and
the extent of redistribution activity. The analysis can be
considered preliminary in the sense that a number of issues
have yet to be explored, for instance the presence of serial
correlation and/or heteroskedasticity. However, the results do
provide some evidence to support the contention that the
redistribution programme has the effect of depressing land
prices in the vicinity of its projects. While this conclusion is still
tentative, the evidence against the supposition that
redistribution puts upward pressure on land prices is quite
strong. That the results are not more consistent and conclusive
is most likely due to the fact that, thus far, the scale of the
redistribution programme has been small relative to the overall
level of activity in the land market.
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6. Qualitative evidence as to how the land market
inhibits the redistribution programme
Anumber of specific concerns have been raised about howthe land market inhibits the land redistributionprogramme. In particular, four main assertions have beenmade: i) land is not available; ii) landowners collude to
not sell to DLA beneficiaries; iii) land is too expensive; and iv) DLA
beneficiaries end up acquiring inferior, marginal land. This section
summarises the views that have been expressed by Provincial
Department of Land Affairs (PDLA) staff on these themes, and
offers some analysis on the basis of what we know about the land
market.
6.1 Land is not available
The statistics in Section 3 above show that, overall, the amount of
land available through the market is more than ample, and that
the redistribution programme would have to be delivering at
several times its present scale in order to begin to deplete the
opportunities presented by the market. As a practical example,
four years ago the PDLA in Limpopo province advertised in local
papers that landowners should inform the office if they might be
interested in selling their land. The response was large, and the
PDLA has not come even close to exhausting the opportunities
presented by those who responded.
However, despite the overall adequacy of the amount of land on
the market, there is a perception on the ground that the land
market is such that adequate land is not available to meet the
needs of redistribution clients. The general sentiment expressed
by PDLA staff is that while there is more than enough land
available, land is not equally available everywhere. Since
beneficiaries would in general prefer to remain where they are, or
at least minimise the distance they must travel or relocate, they
are frequently focussed on a narrow area, and may find that little
land is available there, or may be particularly expensive.
As estate agents are inclined to point out, there is always land
available provided one is willing to pay for it. Although a number
of other factors enter into it, generally speaking an area whose
commercial farmers are thriving is likely to be a sellers market,
whereas an area where farmers are struggling is apt to be a
buyers market. Much or most of South Africa is presently a
buyers market, but some pockets remain where it is particularly
difficult to afford land within the confines of the redistribution
grant system. Viticulture areas in the Western Cape, and certain
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highly productive cane areas in northern KwaZulu-Natal, for
example, are doing quite well, and consequently are not easily
accessed by prospective buyers financed primarily through
government grants. By contrast, in the Queenstown district of
the Eastern Cape, or the Bloemfontein district of the Free State,
or the Bethal district of Mpumalanga, to mention just a few, it is
very much a buyers market. PDLA staff report that a high
fraction of farmers in these areas would be quite pleased to sell
off their farms, as the conditions for commercial agriculture
(especially grain farming in summer rainfall areas) have been
deteriorating for some time.
Another factor that contributes to land availability in specific
areas is farmers experience of, or perception of, security
problems. Commercial livestock farmers in northern KwaZulu-
Natal, for example, complain that profits have been severely cut
by stock theft. Other landowners, e.g. those in the immediate
vicinity of Johannesburg, have shown an eagerness to sell due
to concern for personal safety. As tentatively supported by the
econometric evidence reported in the previous section, what this
suggests is that, owing to fears and prejudices among white
landowners, land redistribution sometimes has the effect of
improving land availability. What this also suggests is that a
stepped-up pace of redistribution might facilitate further
redistribution rather than the opposite.
A final point to be made in respect of land availability is that
the PDLA may become aware of land being available in a variety
of different ways. In part, this owes to the fact that different
PDLAs have adopted different strategies for identifying available
land, but even within a given PDLA there tends to be some
variation. First, sometimes land is identified as available by
applicants before they have even approached the PDLA. This
could be owing to applicants initiative, or it could be a seller
driven project in which the seller has suggested to his farm
workers that they apply for grants so as to purchase the land.16
Second, PDLAs or applicants may sometimes rely upon estate
agents to inform them what land is on the market, or may
consult publications that list properties for sale. Third, some
PDLAs have actively invited landowners to indicate their interest
in selling their land. Fourth, sometimes PDLA staff approach
owners to ask if they would consider selling, even owners who
have not put their land on the market.
While each of these strategies may have its place, what is
quite evident is that, in general, there is too little of the fourth
strategy, that is, directly asking owners regardless of whether
their land is known to be on the market. In those cases where
this does happen, it is often discovered not just that these
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owners are willing to sell, but also that they are often willing to
sell at a good price. One situation in which this has become
evident is in the case of commonage projects, where typically
the PDLA has few options in terms of where the land should be,
and is thus forced to ask owners who have not put their land on
the market. In the northern part of the Free State and parts of
North West, for example, the PDLA has been able to snap up
land for commonage projects at below market rates. Thus,
whereas this sort of situation might be thought to have the
effect of strengthening sellers bargaining power, and thus
making for a difficult transaction, it is frequently discovered that
those who have not actually put their land on the market are
quite willing to part with it, and at a reasonable price. Where the
opportunity may be particularly great to pro-actively inquire
about owners willingness to sell, is in proximity to townships,
squatter settlements, and former homeland areas. Large swaths
of land could be acquired with ease in many such areas,
notwithstanding the fact that present owners may not have the
land on the market.
6.2 Owners collude to not sell
A specific situation in which land may not be available in an
area is when owners there collude with one another to not sell
to redistribution applicants. Most PDLA staff can cite one or two
examples where this has happened or where they have
suspected it of happening. The issue in this instance is not that
the land market is too inactive in the area, but that owners exert
pressure on one another to not sell for land redistribution, i.e.
to blacks. The collusion can take different forms. The subtlest is
simply when owners in an area put personal pressure on an
owner who might otherwise be willing to sell to DLA. This
allegedly happened in a would-be project near Magudu, in
northern KwaZulu-Natal, where farmers colluded with one
another (and possibly with the consultant who had been hired
by the DLA to facilitate the project) to prevent the progress of a
project. A more active form of collusion is when farmers come
together to outbid DLA, as has seemingly happened in the
Bochum area of Limpopo. One provincial representative of
organised agriculture, indicated that some farmers who might
otherwise be willing or even eager to sell, readily hesitate to do
so because of this sense of pressure from ones neighbours. The
representative indicated that in some such instances, owners
might even welcome expropriation as a face-saving way of
parting with their property while still obtaining compensation
for it. This presumes that the compensation would be not
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hugely inferior to what the owner could obtain through a
market sale.
While collusion to not sell to redistribution beneficiaries is
certainly a problem, according to PDLA staff it is not a problem
of major proportions. It is known or thought to occur in a few
specific parts of the country, and even there sometimes
eventually proves unsuccessful, since many owners ultimately
have no choice but to sell. However, these instances of collusion,
however atypical, are very damaging, not least in feeding the
perception that the market mechanism is primarily at fault for
slow delivery. In those areas where collusion does have a serious
impact in deterring redistribution, the government should not
hesitate to initiate expropriation procedures. This may be
expeditious not only for the project/property in question, but
also as a disincentive to other owners in the area to interact in
bad faith with applicants and the government.
6.3 Land is too expensive
The notion that land is too expensive is articulated in a
number of different ways. For example, the National Land
Committee and land NGO affiliates have indicated that the
willing-buyer/willing-seller programme is too expensive,
because it means government must pay market prices (see NLC
1998). Under the pre-LRAD programme, many people expressed
the view that the price of land was simply high relative to the
small size of the grant, and thus had the effect of compelling
applicants to form large groups  which often turned out to be
unmanageable  in order to be able to purchase the land. This
latter is a practical consideration which owed more to the nature
of the grant policy than to exorbitant land prices. Finally, it is
sometimes asserted that land purchased by land reform
beneficiaries via grants tends to be purchased at prices that are
high relative to the true market price, as suggested by the
Ministrys report quoted in Section 2. It is mainly this latter
sense of too expensive that we examine.
To this end, PDLA staff were asked whether they agree with
the perception that DLA tends to over-pay for land, and if not,
whether they have any intuition as to the source of that
perception among others.17 Not surprisingly, most respondents
indicated that there is no such tendency, yet most could also
think of an instance where probably too much money had been
paid.
One such instance, which has become almost legendary, is a
particular restitution case in Northern Cape. In this case, the
settlement of the restitution claim was being hindered by the
landowner, who was holding out for a price around two times
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that of the market price as established by the DLAs valuation.
However, national politicians happened to seize upon this
particular restitution case for its symbolic value, and insisted
that the project should be ready for a handover ceremony in
time to coincide with National Heritage Day. After much
energetic effort to break the impasse, the owner was eventually
given something not far from his original price. Since this time,
other landowners in the immediate area have made it clear to
DLA that they will not consider selling their land (for
redistribution) for less than this individual received.
Another well-known case is an early redistribution project in
the Free State. By all accounts, the project was inspired by a
landowner who was eager to sell his property, which he sought
to do by rounding up a large group of beneficiaries. When the
provincial DLA office balked at the project, due in large part to
concerns over the asking price (as well as other problems), the
beneficiary group itself approached a local political party
branch, which mobilised considerable pressure for the project to
be approved. The sellers role in encouraging the beneficiary
group to express their dissatisfaction through political pressure
has been alleged, but remains unclear.
These examples point to an uncomfortable fact, namely that,
because they tend to be sensitive to political demands, political
leaders may show a tendency to push projects through hastily,
even at the expense of properly concluding price negotiations.
This underlines the importance of routine systems and
procedures that rely as much as possible on objective decisions
made on the basis of pertinent information.
As to why there may be an enduring impression that DLA
tends to over-pay for land in general, PDLA staff expressed the
view that this owes to the fact that in the early days of
redistribution (e.g. 1995 and 1996) certain policies were not in
place, staff were inexperienced in such matters and mistakes
were made. Among the more important policy gaps was the one
requiring a professional valuation. Early on, policies relating to
valuation were relatively lax, for example at one point desk-top
Land Bank valuations were considered sufficient to ensure the
asking price was fair.18 Only in 1997, after Land Affairs officials
had become sufficiently sensitised to the need to have more
rigorous, appropriate checks, was the policy introduced of
requiring independent professional valuations. Since then, this
policy has probably saved the DLA tens of millions of Rand.
However, there remain concerns in some quarters that some of
the professional valuers on whom DLA relies are either under-
qualified (or not adequately familiar with the market in that
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area), or may actively collude with sellers to overvalue the
latters properties. While this conviction is not common to most
PDLA staff who routinely work with valuers, there are certain
areas in which this concern is very strong. Even some estate
agents who are knowledgeable about DLA projects have
expressed the opinion that DLA-commissioned valuations tend
to be too high in their areas.
Apart from concerns with political interference and inept/
corrupt valuers, PDLA staff find that virtually all landowners
initially state a high asking price. However, most PDLA staff also
indicate that the majority of sellers are negotiated down with
little difficulty to the valuation price or even below.19 In many
areas, the DLA is virtually the only buyer, so sellers who are
intent on selling find themselves in a weak bargaining position.
There remain, however, some sellers who are not easily
negotiated down. These latter either eventually withdraw their
offer of sale, bring down their price a while later or sell to
someone else. These instances have the effect of impeding
delivery, frustrating beneficiaries and wasting staff time.
The situation is particularly difficult where the applicants
have a strong desire for a specific property. In principle,
redistribution is different from restitution in that applicants can
shop around to find a property that suits them at a good price.
In practice, however, it often does not happen this way. In some
instances, the project is driven by an ESTA-related demand:
applicants wish to acquire that particular property because it is
has been their home for some years or even generations. In
other instances, a particular property may have been identified
early in the project cycle, and all subsequent planning  which
may take a long time  is based on that particular property.
Because the cost of starting over with a newly identified piece of
land is so high, or because the applicants are focussed on that
particular property for personal reasons, this means effectively
that the seller has a monopoly. Rather than being concerned
that the applicants may choose to buy someone elses property,
the seller knows that he is in a good bargaining position. This is
probably one of the critical weaknesses of the way the demand-
led system tends to manifest itself, even under LRAD.
6.4 Beneficiaries end up acquiring inferior land
It is sometimes suggested that beneficiaries end up acquiring
inferior, marginal land, as in the statement from the Ministrys
report quoted in the previous section. Among PDLA staff, some
agree with this view, while others do not. While we cannot offer
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a technical evaluation of the relative quality of land that has been
acquired through redistribution, we can comment on what
emerged from interviews with PDLA staff; specifically on what the
basis for this perception was among those who maintain that
beneficiaries end up with inferior land.
There are two main points to be made in this regard. First, the
perception that redistribution-acquired land is inferior appears to
be mainly a proposition rather than an observation. The
proposition, in a nutshell, is that farmers want to sell because
they are in financial distress, and that they are in financial
distress because their land is marginal. In other words, the fact
that they are proposing to sell their land to DLA, is taken as
evidence that their land is inferior. At least five PDLA staff who
were interviewed offered explanations that followed this logic.
The second point is that this proposition is flawed, but it is also
not altogether without merit. The flaw has to do with the fact that
farmers have many reasons for wishing to sell their land, of which
financial distress is just one, and which in itself is usually the
result of factors other than land quality.20 As Section 3 showed, an
average of 6.4% of the countrys agricultural land, i.e. some 5.2
million hectares, is bought on the open market every year, and
the degree of market activity is fairly robust across all the
provinces. To suppose that this land is overwhelmingly marginal
strains credulity.
Taking a historical perspective, between 1950 and 1996 the
number of commercial farms declined from 117 000 to less than
61 000.21 The decline of 48% represents a gradual, continuous
process of rationalisation and amalgamation, a process very much
like that characterising other middle and high-income countries
during the course of the 20th century. As farm incomes decline
relative to other opportunities offered by a growing, modernising
economy, farmers and/or their children leave agriculture for more
attractive options elsewhere. Correspondingly, average farm sizes
increase. The fact that title deeds of farms reflect multiple
portions, is largely the result of this historical process of
consolidation. This broad-brush picture of temporal trends in
commercial agriculture and landholding, leads to two conclusions.
First, land purchases are dominated by existing farmers rather
than by new entrants, which is why the average farm size
increases while the number of farms declines. Second, the share
of farmers who leave agriculture over the long-term is huge. This
is so to such an extent, and covers all parts of the country, that it
cannot be explained by relative land quality.
Nonetheless, there is one particular respect in which there is
some merit to the proposition that beneficiaries end up with
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inferior land. The reasoning goes as follows. When a farmer
decides to put his land up for sale and markets it at a
reasonable price  i.e. the price is reasonable taking the land
quality into account  then, provided the area is not generally
depressed, the seller can reasonably expect to find a buyer and
conclude the sale quite quickly, e.g. within five months.22
However, because DLAs project delivery process often takes
longer than this (despite semi-successful efforts to shorten it),
DLA is not in a position to acquire these properties. DLA is more
likely to acquire properties of farmers who cannot find another
buyer. This may be either because the sellers asking price is
too high to attract other buyers (meaning that the land is poor
relative to the price), or because the market for land is badly
depressed.
This latter point, while it cannot be quantified, probably
represents one of the most significant ways in which the
redistribution programme fails to take proper advantage of
opportunities in the land market, or put differently, the normal
functioning of the land market translates into serious
limitations for redistribution. The question that we will address
in due course is whether this is an inevitable consequence of
the willing-buyer/willing-seller approach to redistribution, or
whether it is a problem that can be minimised or avoided by re-
engineering the manner in which the redistribution programme
seeks to tap into the property market.
7. Conclusion: Promising and unpromising avenues
for policy development and further exploration
The purpose of this concluding section is to examine anumber of important policy issues in respect ofimproving the availability and affordability of land forredistribution. The list of issues covered does not
attempt to be exhaustive, but rather to touch on some of the
more promising avenues for further policy development, or by
way of discouraging some of the less promising avenues that are
nonetheless apt to distract policy-makers from what is feasible
and worthwhile.
7.1 The importance of encouraging subdivision
In theory, one way more land could become available on the
market for redistribution would be if large-scale commercial
farmers sold off portions of their properties. In principle, even if
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farmers were inclined to remain on their land, they could make
some of it available to the market, or for land redistribution, by
subdividing it off. Especially for those farmers who are struggling to
service their debts, it might appear that selling off a portion of their
property would be an efficacious way of trying to restore their
financial standing. In addition to increasing the supply of land,
this would have the important benefit of increasing the supply of
smaller properties, i.e. that would more likely be suitable to
emerging farmers.
In practice, however, this sort of partial selling happens rarely,
and only in times of severe distress. Rather, one normally finds
that farmers either want to sell all of a property, or none of it. In
the first place, most farmers in South Africa utilise their land
fully.23 Therefore, a farmer who has decided to sell, would not see
much purpose in selling the farm off in discrete parts, as the
remainder may no longer be considered of an economical size,
either to himself or to potential buyers. A worst-case scenario
would be to sell off a portion of the farm, only to find that the rest
is unsaleable.
Even when bankers encourage farmers to subdivide as a means
of addressing a debt problem, farmers are reluctant to do so. In
general, farmers instincts are to sell a property in its entirety or
not at all. In times of exceptional distress, however, applications for
subdivision do increase. The Department of Agriculture, which
administers the Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act 70 of 1970,
indicates that over the past two years, applications for subdivision
have increased sharply. Presently, it receives 300 applications per
month from farmers who wish to subdivide, about three quarters of
whom indicate that their main reason for wishing to do so is
financial distress. Of these, about one sixth wish to subdivide their
house from the rest of the property so that they can stay in the
house and sell off the rest of the farm. Amongst the rest, most
attempt to sell off around 50% of the farm, keeping the other 50%
for themselves to continue farming.24
Apart from this sort of financial distress, the situation in which
subdivision may be attractive to a landowner, is where the sale of
all the subdivisions would be more or less simultaneous. There are
only two scenarios where this is plausible. The one, of course, is
where the whole property is subdivided and transferred under the
auspices of the land redistribution programme. The other is where
the property has development potential, for example where the
subdivided portions might attract those wishing to buy land for
homes. Of course, this potential must be significant enough to be
worth incurring the costs of getting permission for and then
undertaking subdivision.25
School of Government, University of the Western Cape 31
No.       Occasional Paper Series21
Despite these obstacles, the importance of encouraging
subdivision cannot be exaggerated. The vast majority of
redistribution projects, which do not involve subdivision, are in
the 101 hectare to 500 hectare range. As is evident from Table 3
in Section 3, annual market transactions in properties 500
hectares or smaller comprise only 16% of total land transactions
by area, and on average properties in the 101500 hectare
range cost 77% more per hectare than for the 5011 000
hectare range.26
Nonetheless, PDLAs are hesitant to get involved in projects
that involve subdivision, both because of the costs involved and
because of the uncertainty as to the delays and complications
that might be involved. Encouraging subdivision to better
accommodate the needs of land redistribution will probably
require a clear policy and concerted intervention by government.
In particular, transaction costs associated with subdivision must
be reduced, and to a greater extent borne or shared by
government, above and beyond the redistribution grants.
Moreover, commercial farmers should be sensitised to
subdivision for redistribution as a viable opportunity to
contribute to land reform as well as to improve their own
financial standing.
7.2 Should beneficiaries pay something other than the market value for
land?
One of Riedingers points against the willing-buyer/willing-
seller approach is that market value typically exceeds productive
value by a large margin, thus making the willing-buyer/willing-
seller approach more expensive than, say, the compulsory
acquisition approach which typically relies on productive value.
The fact that market value tends to exceed productive value in
most areas of South Africa is well-established (see Van
Schalkwyk & Van Zyl 1996).
The National Land Committee and other stakeholders have
expressed similar sentiments for the case of South Africa. In a
slight variation, in June 2000 Minister Didiza effectively told the
National Council of Provinces that if government were to fulfil its
land reform objectives it would have to  induce white farmers to
sell their land, and to sell it in terms of equitable compensation
rather than at market value.27
Strictly speaking, such a proposal can be interpreted in two
ways. First, it can be construed to mean that owners should be
compelled to sell at productive value (or in terms of equitable
compensation), meaning that they would be expropriated with
compensation set at that value, or encouraged through threats
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of expropriation to do so. Second, it could mean that the
government would adopt a policy whereby it only approves the
release of grants for land purchase where it so happens that the
owners selling price coincides with, or is less than, the
propertys estimated productive value. We treat each of these
possible interpretations in turn, as a means of evaluating how
practical it might be to alter policy to focus on productive value
or equitable compensation value rather than market value. We
do not however seek to evaluate the proposition on moral
grounds, i.e. to determine on what basis landowners should be
paid.
In terms of expropriation, the Constitution lays out general
principles governing the amount of compensation that should
be paid over to the expropriatee. Section 25(3) of the
Constitution reads in full:
The amount of compensation and the time and manner of
payment must be just and equitable, reflecting an equitable
balance between the public interest and the interests of
those affected, having regard to all relevant circumstances,
including 
(a) the current use of the property;
(b) the history of the acquisition and use of the property;
(c) the market value of the property;
(d) the extent of direct state investment and subsidy in the
acquisition and beneficial capital improvement of the
property; and
(e) the purpose of the expropriation.
While the language of the Constitution does not convey any
sense of prioritisation among these relevant circumstances, nor
any sense of what in practice an equitable balance between the
public interest and the interests of those affected should imply,
certain Land Claims Court judgements have come to constitute
interpretative guidelines. First and foremost, according to the
Land Claims Court, valuation of land expropriated by the state
in pursuance of land reform must be seen as a two-stage
process. In the first stage, the valuer is required to assess the
market value of the land in accordance with established
valuation principles, i.e. principles of assessment derived from
court cases decided under the Expropriation Act 63 of 1975 and
its predecessors, and also foreign precedents where applicable.
In the second stage, the valuer is required to adjust the market
value estimate according to the impact of the other factors listed
in Section 25(3).
What this means is that productive value, as such, does not
enter as a separate consideration  unless factor (a) would be
interpreted as such, which seems unlikely. However, one might
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argue that consideration of some of the other factors of Section
25(3) might have the effect of reducing compensation, and thus
effectively closing the gap between market and productive
value. Seemingly, the only other factor that might appreciably
reduce the compensation to the expropriatee is factor (d), which
pertains to capital subsidies received from the state by the
present owner. The types of subsidies that are implied are of
three kinds: under-payment for the property upon initial
acquisition; subsidised interest rates, meaning primarily long-
term loans from the Agricultural Credit Board;28 and
infrastructure subsidies. At present, there has not been
sufficient accumulation of experience to suggest how great a
difference consideration of factor (d) makes to the overall
compensation offered to the expropriatee. What one can venture
is that the scope of these subsidies in the past was such that, in
terms of the present generation of commercial landowners,
consideration of them will not likely have a major impact on the
theoretical gross compensation to expropriatees, and thus would
not simulate a closing of the gap between market value and
productive value. However, to establish this beyond a doubt
would entail a study in itself.
Turning now to the idea that government could adopt a policy
of only purchasing land when its asking price is commensurate
with its productive value, this raises a number of interesting
issues. The first point to note is that such a policy, in itself,
would not have an effect on the land market, for the simple
reason that government does not have anything close to a
monopsony in the land market, and thus cannot influence
general price levels in this way, except perhaps in a handful of
localities. The second point is that, to the extent some owners
are willing to part with their land at some value deemed by
government to equate to those properties productive value, this
simply means that in those instances market value and
productive value coincide, or that productive value is even
higher.
The third point, however, is absolutely critical. Much of the
public debate about productive versus market value appears to
be premised on the belief that productive value can be derived
precisely and scientifically, whereas the determination of
market value is something rather more arbitrary and messy. In
fact, the opposite is closer to the truth. There is indeed much in
the determination of market value that is subjective, imprecise
and open to abuse, but such is even more the case with
productive value. A true estimate of a propertys productive value
subsumes predictions as to input and output prices, weather
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shocks and trends, changing taxation regimes, interest rates,
the exchange rate, technological changes, etc. into the infinite
future. This is an extremely tall order, and very sensitive to
ones choice of assumptions. Most notably, ones estimate of
productive value is influenced hugely by the choice of
capitalisation rate. A capitalisation rate, or discount rate, is
the denominator of the standard fraction used to determine the
value of a perpetuity. For a simple example, if a given property
can yield a net profit of R100 000 per year and this is assumed
to remain constant in real terms forever, then 100 000/r is the
productive value of that property, where r is the capitalisation
rate. The future stream of income is said to be capitalised into
the value of the land at a single point of time, i.e. the present.
However, what r should be is the subject of endless debate
among economists, valuers and project managers, and is
adjusted up or down according to rather subjective assessments
of risk and alternative opportunities.29 Banks typically use very
high  meaning conservative  capitalisation rates, such as
20%.30 Many business plans submitted for land redistribution
projects by service providers in the past five years, however,
used capitalisation rates of 5% or 10%.31 Note that for a
capitalisation rate of 20%, a property promising an annual net
profit of R100 000 would be construed to have a productive
value of R500 000, but at a capitalisation rate of 5%, the same
property would be reckoned to have a productive value of R2
million, or four times as much. Government could dictate that
for purposes of valuing properties for redistribution, a particular
capitalisation rate be used, but any such choice would be rather
arbitrary, and still not address other difficulties that attend the
estimation of productive value. While the estimation of market
value may also have its pitfalls (the most serious of which is
absence or poor selection of comparable sales), it at least avoids
some of the main hazards of trying to determine productive
value.
In summary, the call to use productive value or equitable
compensation value rather than market value as a basis for
paying owners for their properties, does not have much promise.
If one pursues the expropriation route, then the property clause
of the Constitution would apply. Short of compelling the Land
Claims Court to alter its interpretation of the property clause, or
of amending the Constitution to change the property clause
itself, there appears to be little hope or legal basis of offering
only productive value to expropriatees. Apart from this,
productive value is a rather malleable construct that does not
necessarily advance governments ability to arrive objectively at
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valuation estimates. To the extent that some owners would be
willing to part with their land at a price deemed to be equivalent
to the lands productive value, this merely suggests that
productive value and market value in these instances happen to
coincide.
7.3 The question of supply-led land redistribution
Since as long ago as 1998, the Department of Land Affairs has
been groping to establish some sort of policy on so-called
supply-led land redistribution. By supply-led redistribution is
meant an initiative in which land is secured for the purposes of
redistribution before specific applicants have indicated their
wish to acquire it. This is in contrast to demand-led
interventions, in which beneficiaries either identify land at some
point in the course of the project cycle, or approach the PDLA
already having identified land in the first place. Strictly
speaking, municipal commonages are supply-led projects, as are
some state land disposal projects. However, here we focus
specifically on supply-led initiatives that involve the acquisition
of private land for transfer to specific individuals or groups.
The rationale for contemplating supply-led redistribution
initiatives is threefold. Broadly speaking, there is a common
belief that, first, supply-led initiatives could significantly
accelerate the redistribution of land, and second, they could
enable the land to be acquired more inexpensively. In addition,
there is a third belief that supply-led initiatives would be able to
ensure the acquisition of high quality land, whereas demand-led
projects simply end up with the land that sellers wish to sell, or
cannot react quickly enough to opportunities to buy high
quality land.
 Notwithstanding these possible advantages, significant
concerns have been raised about governments ability to
successfully pursue supply-led projects. The main worry is that
government may find itself in situations where, having acquired
land deemed suitable for redistribution, it then fails or struggles
to dispose of it again. The fear is that the same difficulty
government seems to experience in disposing of agricultural
land already in its possession (e.g. ex-SADT land) may also
obtain in the context of supply-led projects. A related fear is
that, during the interim period (i.e. between purchase and re-
sale), government will be saddled with the burden of holding
that land. The case of the Bapsfontein project in Gauteng is one
example of these risks. The farm was acquired in 1999 with a
view to subdividing it and allocating the portions to emerging
commercial farmers. Despite the full involvement of both the
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PDLA and the provincial agriculture department in the initial
scoping and planning, the transfer of the land to beneficiaries
has not yet taken place. Moreover, even though the land was in
the meantime leased out to a neighbouring farmer, the
buildings on the property have been completely stripped and
vandalised. A second supply-led project in Gauteng has
fortunately not suffered the same fate, but still the government
is some ways away from identifying beneficiaries and
transferring the land, notwithstanding the fact that the property
was purchased more than 15 months ago. A would-be supply-
led project in North West, initiated by the provincial department
of agriculture there, was abandoned before the government took
possession, out of concern for the departments ability to see the
project through in a timely fashion.
The government is rightly concerned about the risky
implications of embarking on supply-led redistribution.
However, there is one important instance where the supply-led
approach might be the ideal solution, and where risks could be
tolerably low. Specifically, if government is serious about de-
congesting over-crowded former homeland areas, which is one
of the stated objectives of the new LRAD programme, then it
might seek to augment communal areas by means of effecting
proactive purchases of large, contiguous blocks of commercial
farmland adjacent to existing communal areas. The delicate
aspect of such an initiative would be ensuring that the new land
administration and landholding arrangements were effected
fairly. The point being made here, however, is to emphasise the
fact that the willing buyer/willing seller approach to
redistribution, does not have to be interpreted as meaning one
single property transaction at a time. In all likelihood, by virtue
of this lands existing location combined with a strategic buying
programme, the land could be acquired quickly, inexpensively
and copiously.
7.4 Overview of policy recommendations
This report has attempted to clarify what are, and are not, the
limitations of the willing-buyer/willing-seller approach to land
redistribution. In order to do this, the paper has examined a
number of areas: the extent of activity in the rural land market
owing to redistribution; the effect of the redistribution
programme on the land market, particularly in terms of land
prices; the manner in which redistribution projects interact with
the land market; and sundry policy issues bearing on improving
access to land for redistribution. We conclude by listing a
number of policy recommendations that follow from the
considerations raised in the paper.
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(1) The typical project cycle has to be more accommodating to shopping
around.
To some extent, this would appear to be well catered for in the
newly revised redistribution programme, which seeks to
abbreviate the project cycle and to empower applicants by
relying on them to do more of the initial footwork themselves.
However, there is still reason to worry that presumably
applicant-driven projects will be based on pieces of land that
have been proposed by sellers, or that, lacking negotiation
skills, applicants will be quick to focus on the first or second
property they become aware of. Moreover, notwithstanding the
new streamlined project cycle, there is still reason to be
concerned that the time lag between project planning and
project approval will be long, and thus exacerbate the extent to
which the projects success hinges upon a particular property.
One way this could be approached is to require that
applicants project proposals reflect on the relative merits of two
or three different properties, and explain why one of these was
chosen over the others. In other words, shopping around could
be turned into a requirement (similar to requiring three quotes
from potential service providers), and would-be sellers could
thus be made aware that they are competing for redistribution
applicants.
(2) Land identification should be postponed until later in the project cycle.
It is well and good to suggest that the project cycle be
abbreviated, but in the event this does not happen to the extent
hoped for, then one measure that could be adopted would be to
postpone land identification until later in the project cycle. This
would effectively mean that the lapse in time between engaging
with a landowner and having final approval with which to
proceed to conveyancing, would be briefer, allowing applicants
to seize opportunities more readily. The premise of this idea is
that, in the past, beneficiaries have not been well served by the
highly technical land-specific planning that was undertaken. An
alternative to this approach would be to pre-approve applicants
in terms of a generic business plan, and then require them to
find land appropriate to that plan, within the stipulated budget,
with final approval being subject to a modest amount of
additional work relevant to that parcel. This is part and parcel of
the idea that government must stop coddling applicants, and
rather must allow them to make more decisions of their own
accord. This proposal could easily be combined with the
previous recommendation. Of course, this proposal would not be
appropriate for projects involving settlement.
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(3) Land should be identified through numerous different means.
The main point to be made here is that neither applicants nor
government acting on behalf of applicants, should limit
themselves to formal advertisements or estate agents listings
when trying to identify properties for possible acquisition.
Neither is it sufficient to set up a database where landowners
are invited to indicate their interest in selling, though this is not
to be discouraged. The reality is that many more property
owners are willing to sell their land than formal advertisements
and listings would indicate. This relates as well to point (6)
below.
(4) When collusion is suspected, numerous approaches can be followed.
Collusion may be the result of outright, rigid racism, and as
such may not be amenable to a reasonable, rational approach.
In these instances, government may have to avail itself of
expropriation. However, in other instances, and potentially the
majority of such cases, the root of the collusion may be mistrust
and ignorance, which can potentially be dispelled through
direct dialogue or the intervention of mutually trusted
intermediaries. Neighbours fear of uncontrolled settlement in
particular can be dispelled through communication. Standing
stakeholders fora and some farmers unions could also serve as
vehicles for getting these messages across.
(5) Government must think more strategically about where to promote
redistribution.
The primary determinant of where redistribution should happen
is presumably where the need is expressed in conjunction with
that districts or provinces spatial development plan. However,
regard should also be had to where land can be acquired
relatively easily. Given what has been established above about
the reasons for which owners are interested in selling, it should
not be difficult to identify those areas in which owners proclivity
to sell is especially great. Areas in which a large number of
farmers are in difficulty, and areas adjacent to former
homelands and informal settlements tend to be especially
promising areas in which to shop for land. It is important at
this point to reiterate that the fact that a high proportion of
farmers in an area are struggling does not mean that their land
is inferior or that newcomers are destined to struggle in
exactly the same manner. This sort of pro-active scoping is, of
course, especially important in the context of supply-led
initiatives.
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(6) Opportunities exist to acquire land in large blocks at good prices.
It is beyond the scope of this report to make specific proposals
about supply-led initiatives, but it is important to note that
certain aspects of this report offer reason for optimism that
supply-led initiatives could be very successful. In particular, the
sensitivity of landowners to changes in the ownership pattern in
their immediate environment suggests that a co-ordinated
buying effort in a given area (e.g. a dozen or so contiguous
properties) could move very quickly. This does not have to be
approached destructively or wantonly, but rather in a manner
that is mutually satisfactory to farmers wishing to leave the
sector or relocate, and applicants seeking land. The best
opportunities for this sort of approach are very likely in
immediate proximity to former homeland areas, where the
extent of overcrowding is particularly great.
(7) Landowners should be encouraged to subdivide portions of their land.
Government is frequently approached by landowners who would
like to help establish former farm workers or others on their
own piece of land. The motivation may be varied, from genuine
kindness, to concerns over ESTA, to their own financial
problems. In many cases, regardless of the owners motivation,
meaningful opportunities present themselves, which
government is not well placed to accommodate. First, owners are
familiar with the onerous requirements of the Subdivision of
Agricultural Land Act, but may not be aware that under certain
circumstances these can be avoided. Second, owners may be
concerned about the cash costs associated with subdivision,
apart from which they would be quite happy to subdivide. Third,
many landowners are generally not familiar with how they can
play a role in the land redistribution programme. What this
suggests is that, especially with the newly revised redistribution
programme, much could be gained by providing landowners
with concise information that they could use to the benefit of
redistribution.
(8) Government must restore its credibility as a land buyer or land
financier.
If the government chooses to pursue the willing-buyer/willing-
seller approach, then it must restore its credibility as a land
buyer or agent for land buyers. This means above all that it
must try to streamline its policies and procedures such that the
average would-be seller (as opposed to the more desperate
would-be seller) does not perceive it to be such a serious
Programme for Land and Agrarian Studies 40
The interaction between the land redistribution programme and the land market in South Africa
Michael Aliber and Reuben Mokoena
disadvantage to engage in selling negotiations with
redistribution applicants or with government on behalf of
redistribution applicants. In other words, government and
redistribution applicants have to understand how normal
market transactions in land typically take place, and especially
the time frame according to which transactions are expected to
be completed. Another implication is that, to the extent that the
government may also simultaneously need to carry a big stick 
i.e. to threaten expropriation  it must do so intelligently,
meaning that all stakeholders must share a clear understanding
about the circumstances in which government may decide to
use expropriation, and why.
Endnotes
1. Jeffrey Riedinger, Wan-Ying Yang & Karen Brook 2000.
Market-based land reform: An imperfect solution.
2. Preliminary Report on the Review of the Settlement/Land
Acquisition Grant  Work in Progress, December 1999, p.8.
3. Lahiff argues persuasively that the Ministers blaming
landowners is mere rhetoric aimed at placating domestic
critics (op cit. p.8).
4. The data for the tables in this section are derived from the
Department of Land Affairs Land Price Data Base, which is
available to the public on the DLAs website. These data are
based on transactions data recorded by the Registrar of
Deeds.
5. This should not be taken to mean 46% of the redistributed
land (in hectares) or 46% of the beneficiary households
occurred in these few districts; chances are, the typical
projects in those districts with abnormally high numbers of
projects have been smaller than the average.
6. This section builds on results previously presented by R
Mokoena and M Aliber, in An econometric analysis of the
effects of the land redistribution programme on land prices
in South Africa, at the June 2001 conference of the
Agricultural Economics Association of South Africa.
7. DLA Position Paper on a Rural Property Tax, Directorate:
Redistribution Policy and Systems, June 1999, p.26.
8. H van Zyl, personal communication, 2000, Bloemfontein.
9. One variable that has not been included is a trend variable,
i.e. 1, 2, 3, etc. Although it would have been natural to have
included such a variable to pick up otherwise unaccounted
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for effects over time, this was not possible because the
between estimator (see below), which forms an integral part
of the estimation procedure, is not feasible where a trend
variable is included.
10. Municipal commonage projects aim to improve peoples
access to municipal land primarily for grazing purposes.
Thus, in contrast to regular redistribution projects, it does
not involve a transfer of land to beneficiaries, though usually
DLA assists the municipality to acquire more land for
commonage purposes. For the period 1995 through 1999,
29% of the land acquired by DLA was by means of
commonage projects.
11. The fixed effects model can be expressed as:
Yit =   i + ß1X1it + ß2X2it +   it.
12. The random effects model can be expressed as:
Yit =   + ß1X1it + ß2X2it +   it + µi.
13. The Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier test can be used to
test for the presence of random effects, and thus assist in
deciding whether one is justified in using the random effects
rather than fixed effects model. This was done for some of
the models described, with significant results. Nonetheless,
the decision whether to use the one or the other approach is
not strictly a statistical issue, but one of interpretation.
14. The between estimator relates to the following model:
 Yi. =   + ß1X1i. + ß2X2it+µi..
15. The expression is associated with as used here is
deliberate. It is meant to convey that, strictly speaking, and
notwithstanding the use of the words increase and
decrease, the statistical tests conducted here are not tests
of causality.
16. PDLA staff are full of stories of landowners who, not having a
sufficient number of farm workers, in fact go out to recruit
additional grant applicants.
17. Admittedly, this is not the most rigorous method for
assessing this issue, not least because PDLA staff might
naturally be disinclined to admit that owners were over-paid
for their land. A more robust treatment of the issue of
whether DLA tends to pay too much for land (in this more
narrow sense) would involve having a professional valuer
perform review appraisals on a random sample of projects,
and then comparing these to what was actually paid.
18. While in principle conservative on account of their attention
to productive value rather than market value, in fact, cases
have been observed of Land Bank valuations being higher
than estimated market value.
19. PDLA staff often do not reveal the valuation price to the
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seller, only that a valuation has been done. This means that
the seller is not aware how much the government would
actually be willing to pay.
20. Among those farmers who find themselves in acute financial
distress, the proximate factor is almost always an inability to
continue loan servicing. In other words, being heavily
indebted makes farmers more vulnerable to short-term
adversities, such as low farm-gate prices or poor yields. In
aggregate, the real debt of farmers has declined steadily
from its peak, in 1985, until 1996, at which point it started
rising again. Many of those farmers who find themselves
over-indebted today are those who took out long-term loans
in the 1970s and 1980s (when interest rates were negative
in real terms) in order to purchase more land or equipment,
thus they were not necessarily among the weaker farmers or
those on worse land.
21. By contrast, over this same period, the total amount of
commercial farmland declined by only 5.4%, from 86.9 to
82.2 million hectares.
22. According to interviews with estate agents who deal in rural
properties, provided there are buyers in the market, a seller
who decides to sell his/her land can expect to sell the
property within two or three months, six months at the
outside. Those farmers who hold out for higher prices,
however, may wait much longer, either until the market
changes, until they are lucky or until they choose to lower
their price.
23. When markets are poor and input costs are high  a
situation that presently characterises most grain-producing
and mixed farming areas of the country, among others 
farmers may shift more marginal lands to natural grazing,
but in the expectation of planting it in the future when it is
once more economical to do so.
24. Personal communication, Mr Thys Botha, National
Department of Agriculture.
25. Over the years, a fair amount of farmland in the vicinity of
cities was subdivided into plots or smallholdings. These were
developed as a mix of rural residences and hobby farms.
However, the market for these plots has deteriorated
dramatically over the past several years, not least because of
residents security concerns. As a result, there is little
incentive to create additional plots through new
subdivisions.
26. These comparisons should properly be made at the
provincial level, in which case the disparities would likely be
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somewhat less dramatic. Even here, however, the
fundamental point remains intact.
27. Business Day, 21 June 2000, Govt will buy farms for land
reform.
28. Although Land Bank interest rates have also historically
been below rates offered on agricultural loans from
commercial banks, an in-principle agreement has been
struck whereby the implicit subsidy on Land Bank loans
would not be counted as an interest rate subsidy for
purposes of adjusting compensation.
29. For a detailed discussion, see, for example Barlowe
(1986:274278).
30. This is the capitalisation rate used by ABSA Bank to
determine productive value for proposed redistribution
projects in Mpumalanga. Banks estimate of productive value
is thus geared to help them conservatively assess the
repayment ability of the property. This practice among
banks may be responsible for the enduring impression that
productive value tends to be below market value.
31. In this context, the purpose of using discount rates was
mainly to demonstrate the economic benefit-cost
relationship of the project, rather than evaluating the
productive value of the property. However, the principle is
precisely the same.
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